Manipur: Silver Lining
With a dramatic fall in insurgency-related fatalities from 416 in 2009 to 134 so far in 2010 (all data till December 12, 2010), Manipur is likely to shed the dubious distinction of being the most violent among the troubled States of India?s Northeast.
According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, the 134 fatalities in 2010 included 103 militants, 24 civilians and 7 Security Force (SF) personnel, in 1,086 recorded incidents, as against 416 persons, including 321militants, 77 civilians and 18 SF personnel, killed in 950 incidents in 2009.
After years of stagnation or deterioration, there have been evident gains for the counter-insurgency (CI) grid in Manipur, with SFs inflicting rising costs on State?s multiple insurgent groups, neutralizing significant numbers of their cadres and contracting their areas of dominance.
The State witnessed just seven major incidents (involving three or more killings) in 2010 as against 29 such incidents in 2009. Significantly, in all these incidents in 2010, it was the militants who were at the receiving end. The major incidents of 2010 were:
October 5: At least four cadres of the Mobile Task Force of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) were killed by the Bishnupur District Police during an encounter at Mutum Yangpi.
July 21: 18 militants were killed and four were injured in a clash between the combined cadres of the Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) and Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), on the one hand, and the Prithvi faction of the Kuki National Front (KNF), on the other, in the Seijang Hill area on the border between the Imphal East and Senapati Districts.
May 14: Five suspected Pakan Revolutionary Army (PRA) militants were shot dead by SFs in the Reserve Forest area, northeast of Khambathel, in the Chandel District.
March 22: Assam Rifles (AR) personnel shot dead four cadres of the United Tribal Liberation Army (UTLA), including the outfit’s top leader James Singson, during a counter-insurgency operation in Leikot area of Tamenglong District.
March 2: Three suspected cadres of the Military Defence Force faction of the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) were shot dead by a rival faction in the Kamuching Hills under the Yairipok Police Station in Thoubal District.
February 17: At least five People?s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) militants were shot dead by Assam Rifles (AR) personnel during an encounter in Chandel District.
February 11: Three suspected Valley-based militants were shot dead by the AR during an encounter at Nambasi village under the Kasom Khullen sub-division in Ukhrul District.
Security Forces were able to keep militant outfits in the State under continuous pressure, with as many as 990 arrests in 2010, including some key figures. In a major boost to the SFs, the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) ?chairman?, Rajkumar Meghen, who went missing after being reportedly arrested in Bangladesh about two months ago, was arrested at Motihari in Bihar on November 30, 2010. A joint Police team from Manipur and Bihar arrested Meghen from near Chhatauni Chowk, as Manipur Police Additional Inspector General (AIG) C.P. Mina identified the militant leader.
Meghen had taken shelter near the India-Nepal border to avoid Police action. UNLF is one of the oldest militant groups in the Northeast, and continues to refuse to engage in talks with the Union or State Government. Similarly, Ningthoujam Tomba alias Koireng, the military chief of KYKL, was arrested from Matigara of Darjeeling District in West Bengal on March 14, 2010.
Further, Gopeshwar aka Athouba, the ?chief’ of the Military Defense Faction of KYKL was arrested on April 2, 2010, from Shillong in Meghalaya. Two chief operatives belonging to the Lamyanba Khuman group of the Military Council faction of the KCP were also arrested by a combined team of Manipur Police and Mizoram Police from Aizawl town in the night of March 15, 2010.
Sustained SF pressure helped persuade a number of militants to surrender. 120 cadres belonging to the Samuel faction of the KNF laid down arms at their camp in Gilgal before the AR and Churachandpur District Police on September 21, 2010. Further, the KNF, which signed a Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement with the Government in August 2005, with a strength of some 370 armed cadres, deposited its arms and ammunition at a designated camp at Natheljang in Sadar Hills of Senapati District on September 15, 2010.
Earlier, 12 cadres of the Pakan Reunification Army (PRA), including its ?secretary? Nungchin (53), surrendered before the Manipur Police and AR along with arms and ammunition in a formal surrender ceremony at Mantripukhri in Imphal West District on September 28, 2010. Similarly, 13 cadres of the Zou Peoples Army (ZPA), including its founder ‘president’ T. Liankhan Khup Zou, surrendered before the Manipur Director-General of Police Yumnam Joykumar Singh and Assam Rifles Inspector-General (South), Major General C.A. Krishnan, at a formal function on the outskirts of Imphal on June 1, 2010.
Meanwhile, leaders of the Lallumba group of the Military Council faction of the KCP, who are engaged in tripartite talks with representatives of the Union Government and the State Government of Manipur, had agreed on January 8, 2010, to surrender en masse. 109 cadres of the outfit were verified on August 7, 2010, for the surrender, though a formal surrender ceremony is yet to take place. According to the SATP database, a total of at least 221 militants have surrendered in the State in 2010.
Complementing the policy of applying pressure on the militants, there have been attempts to initiate or renew talks with various militant outfits. The SoO agreement between the Kuki armed groups and the Union Government that was signed in August 2005, was extended for another year following tripartite talks held in New Delhi on September 29, 2010.
Unsurprisingly, in the context of assessing the fallout of the arrest of its chairman R.K. Meghen, the UNLF admitted that it would face a “gathering clamour for peace talks with India amongst our fraternal revolutionary organisations in Manipur and the Region.
” However, on April 8, 2010, the Union Government made it clear that it would not enter into any kind of dialogue with splinter militant groups operating in the Northeast, nor accept their laying down of arms in a public function. Security Forces have been directed to take ?concerted action? against such splinter groups.
Despite dramatic gains, however, there are residual risks that can cloud over the widening sliver of hope in Manipur at any point of time.
Expressing deep concern over the rising trend of setting up armed groups by taking on the name of an already existing one, the Military Council faction of the KCP stated, on November 10, 2010, that such trends ?besmirched? movements to restore the ?sovereignty? of the land. On the occasion of the 46th anniversary of its formation, on November 24, 2010, moreover, the UNLF vowed to continue its ?liberation struggle?, despite the setbacks it had received.
Despite the SoO agreement between the Kuki armed groups and the Union Government, further, various Kuki groups were involved in at least 41 incidents of violence in 2010, in which two civilians and 23 militants were killed.
The United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF), on July 15, 2010, stated that new militant outfits had emerged within the Kuki National Organsation (KNO) under the SoO with the Government.
Moreover, KNA, a signatory to the SoO agreement, had declared, in January 2010, its objective of creating an autonomous Kuki State under the relevant articles and provisions of the Indian Constitution.
Similarly, the KNF, another signatory to the SoO agreement, raised the demand for a separate State for the Kukis within the Constitution of India, during discussions with the Union Home Secretary G. K. Pillai, during the latter?s visit to Manipur on February 26, 2010.
Beneath the falling graph of violence in the State, however, huge campaigns of extortion persist. Militant networks target Government offices and officials, local self-Government and educational institutions, health centres, commercial establishments and the wider civilian population alike.
Almost all the armed groups extract ?levies? and ransoms from residents and transients in their areas of operation. The SATP database, in its partial estimate (a preponderance of such cases go unreported) records at least 118 extortion incidents in 2010 (till December 12). On September 4, 2010, the Council of Teachers? Association (COTA) demonstrated in all nine Districts of the State, protesting against the persistent extortion notices by different militant groups.
The Imphal West District Police arrested a cadre of the ?Vice Chairman faction? of PREPAK at the Regional Institute of Medical Science (RIMS) gate on December 8, 2010, after he had extorted an unspecified amount of money from RIMS Doctors, Government employees and the general public, purportedly for ?party funds?.
The arrested cadre was serving as a peon at the Manipur Secretariat.
On August 6, 2010, the Handicapped Development Foundation (HDF), Manipur, criticized the monetary demands being made by a militant group in Imphal West District. The KCP, as a ?concession?, subsequently decided, during a ?cabinet meeting? some time in first week of November, to suspend monetary demands from private individuals.
Violence against ?outsiders? in Manipur represents another dimension of persisting trouble in Manipur. Meitei insurgent groups in particular have been spearheading xenophobic excesses. According to SATP database, nine persons have been killed and three persons have been injured, in 13 incidents of violence against non-locals, in 2010 (till December 12).
Ethnic rivalry between Nagas, Kukis and Meiteis remains another aspect of continuing violence in Manipur. Thus, Naga groups imposed a blockade on NH-39 with effect from April 24, 2010, in protest against the holding of elections to the Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in Manipur after two decades.
Again, on May 5, 2010, there was a stand-off between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and the Government of Manipur on the issue of the outfit?s general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah?s visit to his ancestral village, Somdal in Manipur?s Ukhrul District.
The Tamenglong, Senapati, Ukhrul and Chandel Districts of Manipur figure in the projected territory of Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) conceived of by the NSCN-IM.
The apex community group of the Kuki tribe, the Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM), sent an open letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declaring that the Kuki people were opposed to Muivah?s visit.
Eventually, on June 5, 2010, the Central Government persuaded Muivah to leave Vishwema village (near the border of Nagaland and Manipur) where he had been camping since May 5, 2010.
The Central Government also deployed para-military forces to assist the Government of Manipur to hold elections to the ADCs. Through patient negotiations with different Naga groups, the blockade of NH-39 was lifted on June 18, 2010.
The ADC elections were held in two phases on May 26 and June 2, 2010, amid violent protests by Naga groups. The elections had a mixed response, with an uneven voter turnout, varying between zero to 90 per cent polling in various places.
The Nagas demand an ?alternative arrangement? for their community. Mass public rallies were held in four hill Districts of the State ? Ukhrul, Senapati, Chandel and Tamenglong, demanding severing of political tie with the Government of Manipur and in support and reaffirmation of the declaration of the Naga People?s Convention (NPC) of July 1, 2010 seeking such an “alternative arrangement”.
The Manipur Police Department received intelligence inputs that the NSCN-IM had decided, at the ?highest level?, to selectively target and eliminate elected members of the ADC belonging to the Naga community, who failed to ?honour? its diktat for the boycott of the ADC elections and, after getting elected, refused to resign from their posts, despite ?specific directions?.
However, Secular Progressive Front spokesperson N. Biren categorically said that the question of ?alternative arrangement? was not on the agenda of the first round of the tripartite talk held at Senapati on December 3, 2010, involving officials of both State and Central Governments and representatives of the United Naga Council.
Another disturbing trend that has emerged recently is the nexus between the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) and militant groups active in the Northeast.
In Manipur, the People?s Liberation Army (PLA) and PREPAK have established links with the CPI-Maoist.
Kanchan, the West Bengal State ?secretary? of the CPI-Maoist, who was arrested on December 3, 2010, revealed during interrogation that the Maoists in West Bengal had received a huge cache of arms and ammunition from PREPAK. These weapons had also been distributed in Jharkhand and Orissa.
Earlier on October 21, 2008, the Maoists had inked a three-point pact with the PLA, which assured the Maoists of initial logistics support they needed in the Northeast.
Subsequent indications suggest that this has been well exploited by the Maoists to secure wider alliances and a deeper presence in the region.
Significantly, the strength of the bloated Manipur Police has declined from 627 to 613 Policemen per 100,000 population, though this is still much higher than the national average, at 128. However, the State Police has set up a Subsidiary Multi Agency Centre (SMAC) to bolster its intelligence gathering and sharing mechanism.
Director General of Assam Rifles Lieutenant General K.S. Yadava, on March 24, 2010, stated that, after the Centre had approved deployment of 26 additional Assam Rifles battalions along the India-Myanmar border, at least three of these battalions would be used on the border to check movement of militants and smuggling.
The decline in violence in Manipur, and the reverses that have been inflicted on various militant groups, open up avenues for a more enduring stability. Unfortunately, the political space in Manipur continues to be occupied by an incompetent kleptocracy.
In the absence of greater political probity and administrative maturity, the gains of the recent past may yet again be frittered away, as were the opportunities of declining strife in 2002-2003.
Unless the gains of 2010 are consolidated and translated into political initiatives providing economic and administrative relief to the people of Manipur, the contracting spaces for violence may once again begin to expand.
